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 The process through which leaders are chosen in democratic societies has a 
significant influence on the function of governance.  Voters hold the prerogative of 
electing their representatives and in doing so delegate to them the authority to make 
important policy decisions on their behalf.  “Thus,” Arend Lijphart noted, “the electoral 
system is the most fundamental element of representative democracy.” (1994, p. 1) The 
goal of this research paper is to determine if there are differences in voter and candidate 
engagement between two types of local elections found in Santa Clara County: The 
commonly used basic at-large (BAL) process and the more rare at-large by-seat (ALBS) 
system.  To the extent the ALBS system is found 
to be beneficial, it offers municipalities an 
additional and perhaps compelling option for 
elections reform. 
 The bulk of California municipalities elect 
their city councils through a basic at-large system.  
In the BAL process, candidates run citywide 
without a seat or district designation.  Residents 
may cast votes up to the number of openings 
being considered for election.  Candidates equal 
to the number of openings who receive the highest 
number of votes are elected (see Diagram 1). (CSC, 2013b)                                                                                                                                                      
 However, the cities of Santa Clara and Sunnyvale use a unique at-large by-seat 
system.  In the ALBS process, city council candidates stand for election citywide but run 
for an individual “seat.”  This seat does not reflect a geographic area or district, and can 
Diagram 1 
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be thought of as the “slot” for which a candidate 
runs.  The candidate who receives the highest 
number of votes in the contest for each individual 
seat is elected (see Diagram 2). (CSC, 2013a) To 
date, these are the only two municipalities in the 
state to use the ALBS system in a November 
general municipal election process. 
 Proponents of both BAL and ALBS 
elections contend that their favored process is 
superior.  They cite increased levels of voter and 
candidate participation in their preferred system 
as well as complexity or political barriers that decrease involvement in the system which 
they oppose.  However, to date there has been little study of the anecdotal and 
quantifiable effects of either.  This suggests two questions: Are there measureable 
differences between the BAL and ALBS systems regarding voter and candidate 
engagement?  And, if so, how are the variations manifested in the public process?   
 
WHY IT MATTERS 
 Voters, politicians and administrators all have a stake in the elections process.  
Voters should be provided a system that will engage them and correctly reflect their 
collective electoral decisions.  Candidates should be afforded a format that is 
approachable and allows them to be judged fairly and openly by the public.  While 
attention is rightly paid to the rapport between voters and candidates, it is important to 
Diagram 2 
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recognize that the form and structure of the process play an influential role in the 
eventual outcomes of elections. (Bowler, Donovan & Karp, 2006, p. 434) It is in this vein 
that City Clerks and elections officials perform a vital function in administering the 
process and serving as experts in the policy area.  Fostering “neutral and impartial” 
elections is a professional duty outlined in the International Institute of Municipal Clerks 
Code of Ethics. (IIMC, 2012) The nature of the process may influence who seeks 
election, the tenor of debate and how readily residents take part by voting.  It is a core 
belief of City Clerks that elections systems which allow greater involvement and more 
informed electorates foster a stronger democracy. 
 The rules of an elections system are a representational conduit through which the 
needs and social conditions of a community manifest themselves in the process of 
governance.  In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam states, “Government 
institutions receive inputs from their social environment and produce outputs to respond 
to that environment.” (p. 9) At the most basic level, voters provide inputs through those 
they elect to public office.  Lijphart has contended, “This indispensible task in 
representative democracies is performed by the electoral system – the set of methods for 
translating the citizens’ votes into representatives’ seats.” (1994, p. 1) It follows that the 
manner in which both voters and candidates are engaged in an elections system is 
important as a bridge between the will of people and their government. 
 There has been an historic downward trend in the United States regarding actual 
voter turnout (Putnam, 2000, pp, 31 – 33) which has been called, “… an embarrassment 
in a country whose core self-understanding rests on a commitment to democratic self 
governance.” (Williams, 2005, p. 637) While there are varying opinions regarding the 
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extent or causes of lower voter turnout in the US, it has been contended that an 
explanation should focus on the institutional structure of political systems rather than the 
motivations or behaviors of voters and candidates. (McDonald & Popkin, 2001, p. 970) 
 Representative democracy and the performance of its various structures and 
institutions have been a topic of study for millennia.  Theorists ranging from Aristotle to 
Mill to Tocqueville have postulated the relative benefits and faults of various forms of 
democratic governance. (Putnam, 1993, pp. 9 – 13) It has been noted that “democracy 
occupies a privileged place” in the body politic in the United States. (Westheimer & 
Kahne, 2004, p. 237) Overall, Americans are afforded the opportunities and freedom to 
influence government which are on par or greater than most other democracies.  This 
includes the ability to express personal views through political activism, issues advocacy, 
and directly campaigning for candidates. (Putnam, 2000, p. 31) 
 On a broad level, the study of American elections processes has been the subject 
of significant institutional and academic attention.  However, the bulk of these studies 
have focused on higher profile federal and statewide contests.  The prevalence of local 
elections has been recognized; “ … in a federal system of over 80,000 governments, local 
elections are both the most numerous and frequent type in American politics.”  Also, that 
the “overwhelming bulk” of the local elections in the United States are at-large contests. 
(Lieske, 1989, pp. 150, 153) Despite this, the lack of academic attention in the area has 
been lamented for decades.  Lieske noted more than twenty years ago that the study of 
local elections systems was, “… scant, limited, and largely relegated to the professional 
sidelines ... .” (1989, p. 150) As recently as 2007, Oliver and Ha echoed this sentiment, 
“Nowhere is this information gap greater than with respect to local elections. … 
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Although these elections arguably represent the most immediate democratic experience 
for a majority of Americans, political scientists have little understanding of what 
determines voter choice in these settings.” (2007, p. 393)  
 While the study of local elections has been sparse, information regarding the 
unique ALBS system is even more so, currently limited to anecdotal information and a 
few staff reports.  This is understandable, as the adoption of Santa Clara and Sunnyvale’s 
ALBS systems were the result of local reform efforts to enhance the elections process and 
not as academic exercises.  The concept of home rule and political innovation have 
shown the “… capacity of local governments to restructure basic features of their 
political organizations, and their interest in doing so.” (Briffault, 2006, p. 3) While the 
Briffault study focused on more recent events, it has generally been contended that direct 
democracy such as the initiative process allows a more engaged electorate. (Tolbert, 
McNeal & Smith, 2003, p. 24) Certainly, the electorate was directly involved in making 
the ALBS policies through the creation of charter review committees, placing the 
measures on the ballot, and considering the pros and cons when casting their ballots.  
That said, it would be of value to assess if those changes in electoral policy led long-term 
to a more engaged citizenry and have demonstrated the capacity to be an reform model 
for other municipalities. 
 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
 The authority for the BAL process is provided in the Government Code and is the 
prescribed system for general law municipalities that rely on the State Constitution for 
their operational rules. (State of California, 2012) It has also been adopted by many 
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communities which have formulated and approved their own city charters.  However, 
charter cities have the additional latitude to enact different elections systems that may be 
of benefit to the unique needs of their individual communities. 
 The charter changes necessary to adopt an ALBS system in the City of Santa 
Clara and City of Sunnyvale were originally enabled by the early 1900s Progressive era 
“direct democracy” movement.  These efforts granted municipalities the “home rule” 
autonomy to directly influence laws beyond, though not in conflict with, the State 
Constitution.  Through this the public were provided the benefit of the initiative, 
referendum and recall processes. (Silva & Barbour, 1999, Pp. iii, 4; Gerston & 
Christensen, 2012, pp. 5, 25 – 27) 
 In the mid 1960s, the City of Sunnyvale faced “… a conflict of interest scandal, 
budget woes and a stalled downtown project,” in addition to the resignation of the City 
Manager and a basic at-large City Council election fielding 22 candidates.  Following a 
tumultuous election cycle, the City Council convened a Citizens’ Charter Committee in 
1967 to consider possible reforms to the City Charter.  In November of that year, the 
Committee proposed a change from the BAL system to an ALBS elections process, 
which was placed on the June 1968 ballot as Proposition C. (CSV, 2006) The argument 
in support of Proposition C stated, “The numbering of Council Seats will help insure that 
Councilmen will be more responsive and responsible to the electorate.  As a result of the 
change the electorate will be able to give specific candidates more effective support.” 
(CSV, 1968) The Charter amendment was approved by a 15,190 (76.33%) “Yes” and 
4,708 (24.66%) “No” vote, changing the election of City Council members from a BAL 
to an ALBS process. (County of Santa Clara, 1968) 
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 The City of Santa Clara followed shortly thereafter and in 1971 constituted a 
Charter Revision Advisory Committee to consider potential reforms and changes to its City 
Charter.  Among their recommendations, the Committee suggested a move from a BAL to 
an ALBS elections system (Wise, 1972) which was placed on the November 1972 ballot as 
Measure G.  While there were no pro or con ballot arguments, information from the period 
indicates the main reasons for proposing the change were the creation of greater 
accountability among incumbents and enhanced voter engagement.  In July of 1972 the San 
Jose Mercury News wrote, “Numbering of the council seats would mean that a candidate 
could challenge any incumbent directly by filing for his seat.” (Wise, 1972) In August of 
the same year, the newspaper stated, “Another change numbers council seats, while not 
changing the at-large election method.  It makes possible a candidate zeroing in on one of 
the incumbents by filing specifically for his seat.” (SJMN, 1972) Measure G was approved 
by a 17,650 (65.66%) “Yes” and 9,229 (34.34%) “No” vote, adopting an ALBS system. 
(CSC, 2000; CSC, 2006) 
 In an interview with Gary Gillmor, Mayor of Santa Clara from 1969 through 1977 
during the change in election systems, he indicated that there were three main reasons for 
the charter amendment adopting ALBS elections.  The primary focus was accountability.  
The ALBS system allowed a person to run against an incumbent or candidate based on 
their track record without having to “run against the entire system” and the combined 
strength of the field of candidates found in the BAL process.  Another reason was to avoid 
the common practice of “single-shot” or “bullet” voting, where people cast only one vote 
for their most favored candidate rather than all of their allowed votes.  If done in a BAL 
system where multiple contests are considered collectively, this mathematically allows 
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greater weight to a single vote and therefore stronger support for one candidate.  It was 
thought the separate contests in the ALBS system would eliminate the need to bullet-vote 
and offer the public the ability to take part more fully in choosing more of their Council 
Members.  Additionally, it was also hoped that the multiple seat openings would engage 
geographic areas outside of the City’s downtown neighborhood through the perception of 
greater opportunity to seek office. (Gillmor, 2013) 
 While there are many benefits of the ALBS system, it has not been without 
controversy.  In 2009, supporters of the BAL process asked the City of Santa Clara’s 
Ethics Committee to recommend that the City Council study a return to that election 
system. (CSC, 2009a; CSC, 2009b) Their concern regarding the ALBS process had been 
heightened by confusion in the 2008 election cycle, when a candidate rescinded his 
nomination papers for one seat and filed in another just a few minutes prior to the closing 
deadline.  This left one candidate unexpectedly unopposed and multiple challengers 
running in another seat.  The City amended the policy to address the issue rather than 
changing from the ALBS elections system.  In previous years, candidates had been 
allowed to pull nomination papers in multiple seats simultaneously, enabling the 
jockeying evident in the 2008 filing process.  The City changed this practice to allow 
only one set of nomination papers to be pulled at a time.  While candidates can rescind 
their nomination documents for one seat and request a set for another, they cannot be 
issued papers for multiple seats concurrently.  Since the paperwork and gathering of 
signatures necessary to file for a new seat is time-consuming, the policy curtailed last-
minute gamesmanship and provided greater clarity in the nominations process. (CSC, 
2009c) 
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 Additionally, while Santa Clara is an All-American Award-winning city, concerns 
had been raised regarding the ethnic makeup if its City Council.  The San Jose Mercury 
News noted that the City Council lacks representation from emerging minority 
communities.  While the City has 37% Asian and 19% Latino residents, (Rodriguez, 
2011) the Council is predominantly Caucasian.  General concerns about potential barriers 
to public service prompted the City Council in 2011 to create a formal Charter Review 
Committee comprised of interested community members.  While the Committee did not 
suggest a change to district elections, they did recommend a switch from the ALBS to a 
BAL system. (CSC, 2012a) The City Council accepted the report of the Committee 
though did not act on the recommendation at the time, referring the topic to their Council 
goal-setting process. (CSC, 2012b) However, a recent assessment of the election system’s 
performance in the 2012 general municipal election was completed by Carolyn Schuk of 
the Santa Clara WEEKLY.  She indicated, “…the winners in Santa Clara’s city-wide seat 
system were also the top vote getters overall.  And analysis by precinct doesn’t change 
that any.  Santa Clara’s voting patterns are remarkably uniform across the city.” (Schuk, 
2012) 
 
REVIEW OF ELECTIONS SYSTEMS 
 Although there are numerous election types found on an international level, local 
contests in California use a few main systems.  Those which require a majority of votes 
for a winner to be elected tend to use a primary and runoff elections process.  In this, 
candidates initially compete in a primary election.  If a candidate does not reach a 50% 
+1 vote majority, a runoff election is held.  The primary and runoff elections are often 
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consolidated with the state primary and general elections.  More common, especially in 
smaller municipalities is the plurality system.  In this, one election is held in which the 
highest vote-getter wins, regardless of if a majority reached.  Some, mostly larger cities 
in the state, are divided into geographical districts for the sake of electing representatives 
from various regions of the municipality.  However, the bulk of the city councils are 
elected at-large, where the entire electorate is allowed to vote for a candidate for each 
opening.  Plurality, at-large processes are found in the cities used as benchmarks for the 
comparison in this project. 
 While the BAL and ALBS systems are both elected at-large and citywide, they 
differ in a number of ways.  Practitioners, elections officials and participants have noticed 
anecdotal distinctions regarding their influence on the political and governmental 
process. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012) It is believed that the BAL system 
fosters a more civil discourse while the ALBS process provides greater accountability.  
With multiple candidates vying for office collectively in the BAL system, competitors 
may be hesitant to be critical of each other even in cases where it is warranted.  The 
nature of hard-hitting debate between two candidates in a multiple person contest often 
sheds votes to other viable contenders.  In this case “viable” candidates are considered 
those with some combination of the name identification, fundraising ability, volunteer 
base, track record and other resources necessary to resonate with voters and win.  While 
this may create a more civil discourse, it may also stifle debate if contenders shy away 
from warranted criticism of each other out of concern for losing votes to others in the 
field.  In the ALBS system it is more likely that two viable candidates will face each 
other directly.  This enables them to engage in a more vigorous discussion and campaign 
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without the risk of shedding votes to other candidates.  As such, the ALBS system may 
provide the platform for a more robust debate and greater accountability, in both open 
seats as well as with targeted incumbents. (CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012) 
 Once the election cycle is finished, the BAL and ALBS systems continue to 
influence the manner in which politics manifests itself in the function of government.  In 
a BAL system, council members serve with former opponents once elected.  They may be 
less collegial due to ill feelings from the campaign process or less collaborative because 
they view each other as competitors for reelection.  This can cause political 
gamesmanship and the desire to prove value above their peers in the eyes of voters.  In 
the ALBS system, council members have not been direct competitors, nor will they be for 
reelection to their individual seats.  This may foster greater civility and a willingness to 
share information or support each other’s ideas on the basis of sound policy, with less 
concern of the inter-council political ramifications.  The possibility of running for 
reelection unopposed in the ALBS system may also play a role in the nature of service on 
the council.  Council members may be more inclusive and responsive to community 
needs if encouraged by the possibility of running for re-election either unopposed or 
without mainstream opposition. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012) 
 Statistics regarding candidate and council member behavior are not readily 
available to assess the validity of these subjective observations regarding the systems’ 
influences on politics and governance.  However, voter turnout and candidacy data do 
exist and can provide a base on which to consider if the systems differ as they relate to 
voter engagement and candidate engagement. 
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Voter Engagement: It is believed that the BAL system allows more flexibility 
while the ALBS system allows more full engagement.  In this case, engagement refers to 
the manner in which members of the public participate in the election, interface with and 
understand the ballot, and cast their votes.  In the BAL system, residents can consider the 
contenders as a group and vote for their preferred candidates without the constraints of 
the seat-related ballot structure.  The ALBS system would limit this choice to the 
candidates who file for a particular seat.  Additionally, the BAL system’s consideration 
of all candidates collectively allows residents to bullet-vote and lend stronger support for 
their favorite contender.  While academic research regarding bullet voting is limited, it 
has been identified as a common political strategy in Santa Clara contests prior to the 
adoption of the ALBS system. (Gillmor, 2013) The ALBS system offers more robust 
engagement by allowing residents to cast a vote for each opening without the fear of 
dilution among multiple candidates.  Since the contest for each opening is considered 
independently, residents can cast votes in each contest without the concern of being 
overpowered by those who bullet-vote.  As such, the ALBS system may allow fuller 
participation and foster less fall-off between the total votes cast by the electorate and 
those tendered in municipal races. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Gillmor, 2013; Shanks, 
2012) 
The actual ballot layouts also provide a different interface for the voter, which can 
in turn influence overall municipal turnout.  In the BAL system, candidates are lumped 
into one contest, with the participant allowed to cast votes equal to the number of 
openings.  Some contend this is an easier voting process, allowing participants to choose 
their favorites at once, without being subjected to a number of different ballot questions.  
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However, critics of the BAL process argue that confusion regarding the number of votes 
able to be cast or fatigue when comparing candidates from a long list of contenders may 
cause greater fall-off.  The ballot for the ALBS system has an individual contest listing 
the candidates for each seat up for election.  Participants are allowed one vote for each 
race rather than consolidating all of the contests together.  Some contend that this step-
by-step process and ability to compare candidates by seat avoids confusion and voter fall-
off.  However, critics of the ALBS system may argue that the task of considering 
multiple seats instead of one combined contest will lead to even greater fatigue. (CSC, 
2011; Shanks, 2012) In practice, it is likely that the system with a more clear match-up 
between contenders will enable greater voter decisiveness and therefore higher turnout. 
The goal of greater participation is one with practical value.  In Unequal 
Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, Lijphart indicates that one of the 
necessary elements of representative democracy is citizen participation to create 
responsiveness among elected officials. (p. 1) It follows that the greater the participation 
among voters, the higher the levels of representation, responsiveness and accountability 
from government officials.  This concept is a core element of the ALBS/BAL 
comparison.  If voters feel the need to bullet-vote in the BAL system, they effectively 
decrease their level of participation.  Similarly, if they suffer increased confusion or 
fatigue from either the ALBS or BAL system, this is a barrier to their ability to be fully 
engaged.  On an international basis a number of factors have been seen to influence 
participation through voter turnout.  These include compulsory voting, modified 
registration laws, less frequent elections and weekend election days. (Lijphart, 1997, p. 2) 
Additionally the lack of easily accessible information such as party affiliation have 
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caused local “down ballot” non-partisan races have struggled regarding voter turnout 
parity with partisan races at the top of the ballot. (Wright, 2008, pp. 13, 14) Although the 
bulk of the relevant rules in California are outlined in the Elections Code and are static, 
the election type does determine the basic ballot layout which can in turn influence voter 
participation.  While the relative clarity of the BAL and ALBS ballot types can be 
debated, it is probable that the more accessible and straightforward ballot will lead to 
more robust participation. 
Candidate Engagement: It is believed that the BAL and ALBS systems differ 
regarding candidate engagement.  In this case, candidate engagement refers to the manner 
and structure through which potential candidates choose to seek office, or not, in 
municipal contests.  It is likely that the process which is more appealing will engage a 
higher number of candidates to file nomination papers to seek election.  In general, it is 
thought that the BAL system is the easier in which to file to seek office, while the ALBS 
system allows greater strategic flexibility regarding the field of contenders.  With only 
one candidate filing option and all contests considered collectively, the BAL system is 
the more simple of the two.  This may be beneficial to candidates who are confused or 
intimidated by the process of seeking office.  Additionally, some candidates may be more 
comfortable standing for election among a group and shy away from the inherent 
contentious nature of running for a seat directly against an opponent.  However, the 
ALBS system allows candidates to file for an individual seat to either run against or 
avoid facing an incumbent or other challenger.  Contenders may in general be more 
strategic and are provided the flexibility to seek office without facing a political ally or 
someone who shares the same social or ethnic constituency.  In this, the ALBS process 
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may permit multiple candidates from emerging minority communities to seek election 
simultaneously without marginalizing or “splitting” a shared support base as might be 
seen in the BAL system. (CSC, 2009b; CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012) 
It should be noted that the structure of an elections process can have an influence 
on the success of the contenders.  This, in turn, can affect the willingness of candidates to 
file to seek office based on their perceived likelihood of winning.  For example, the sheer 
number of candidates in a contest has been shown to have an effect on individual success 
rates.  Congleton and Steunenberg’s study of voter discernment and candidate entry 
indicated, “Generally, the probability of success falls as the number of candidates 
increases … and expected vote shares diminish.” (1998, p. 298) Some candidates may 
wish to seek election with the clarity of an ALBS contest rather than fighting for attention 
in a larger group of candidates as seen in the BAL system.  This is the case both in open 
seats as well as those who choose to challenge an incumbent. 
Candidate incumbency plays a large role in the choice of a competitor to seek 
elected office, or not.  This is seen in the strategic entry of candidates either avoiding a 
race against an incumbent or seeking to face an incumbent in the most tactical manner.  It 
has been widely shown that incumbents have a higher probability of being elected than 
challengers.  This has been attributed to greater resources of incumbents to provide 
constituent services, access to media coverage and fundraising ability.  Additionally, 
having already been elected, incumbents have a previous history of appealing and 
successful characteristics which represent less perceived risk for voters. (Anderson & 
Glomm, 1992, p. 207; Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2008, p. 1006) This has a 
deterrent effect on challengers choosing to face an incumbent, “… potential challengers, 
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knowing that incumbents can derive large direct benefits from resources at their disposal, 
will be less inclined to enter the fray – and this will be particularly true of potential 
challengers with higher opportunity costs, hence higher quality.” (Cox & Katz, 1996, p. 
479) While the bulk of these studies were of US Congressional races, similarities can be 
expected in municipal contests. When considering the strategic entry into a local election, 
challengers may want either the ability to seek office in an open seat without an 
incumbent, or, if the defeat of the incumbent is the goal, the ability to face them in the 
most competitive manner.  The direct competition by individual seat in the ALBS system 
may allow candidates to be more strategic regarding the nature of incumbency in the 
elections process. 
The basic structure of the ALBS system in Santa Clara and Sunnyvale provides a 
greater opportunity for challengers to seek election without facing an incumbent.  Both 
cities have seven seats on their City Councils, with one seat in Santa Clara held by a 
directly elected Mayor, as well as a two-term limit.  The combination of term limits and 
by-seat elections ensures a rotation of openings without an incumbent for consideration 
by quality candidates.  In a BAL system the incumbent and open seats are combined into 
one contest.  It is unlikely that in a municipality without term limits all of the incumbents 
would choose not to seek reelection.  Even in a term-limited environment, with the 
rotation of incumbent and open seats it is expected that one or more sitting council 
members would seek reelection in each cycle.  As such, it is unlikely in the BAL system 
that a challenger would have the option to stand for election without an incumbent 
sharing the same ballot. 
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In cases where challenging an incumbent is the goal, the ALBS structure also 
plays a role.  In non-partisan elections, much of the benefit or power of incumbency 
relates to name recognition among voters.  Similarly, because incumbents, former 
incumbents or previously unsuccessful candidates already possess some name 
identification, they start with an electoral base on which to build. (Lieski, 1989, p. 168) 
Ensley, de Marchi and Munger go on to clarify, “… in complex electoral settings, 
incumbents should have an advantage.  The more complex the setting, the greater is the 
extent of this advantage.” (2007, p. 234) The inherent structural differences in the ALBS 
system provide a more direct and less complex relationship between challenger and 
incumbent.  Additionally, the prospect of a direct, head-to-head contest against a strong 
competitor may have an influence on the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election, or not.  
In their study of the incumbency advantage, Engstrom and Monroe indicated, “… the 
reason for withdrawal was likely the anticipation of a rough campaign” (2006, p. 4) of 
seated US House Members’ choices to voluntarily not seek reelection.  While the 
dynamics are different in a term-limited local environment, the more direct challenging 
of an incumbent in the ALBS system may also play a role in their consideration to seek a 
second term. 
  
CASE STUDIES: Santa Clara, Sunnyvale and BAL Benchmarks  
 Due to these factors, the BAL and ALBS systems have different influences on the 
conflict inherent to the democratic political process.  In theory, the BAL system provides 
the platform for a more civil election cycle and less collegial policy process.  At the same 
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time, the ALBS system may foster a more contentious election cycle and more 
collaborative policy process. (CSC, 2011; Shanks, 2012)  
 While the differences between the BAL and ALBS systems may seem nuanced, 
the reliance of democracy on fair and impartial elections provides them weight in the 
study of local government.  The questions raised by these differences are at the nexus 
between the political and public administration realms, with the public, politicians and 
administrators all as stakeholders.  This leaves the consideration of the ALBS system at 
an interesting point.  While the academic body of knowledge regarding government is 
significant, the study of local elections is limited and research regarding the rare ALBS 
process almost nonexistent.   
 To determine if there are quantifiable differences in voter and candidate 
engagement between the ALBS and BAL systems, appropriate benchmark cities and 
sources of data are necessary.  While BAL cities are plentiful, ALBS cities are not nearly 
as common.  There was scant information on the Secretary of State or Fair Political 
Practices Commission websites regarding the elections systems found in municipalities.  
However, a 2006 report for the City of Sunnyvale surveyed the 20 largest counties in the 
state to identify ALBS cities.  The research indicated that only Santa Clara and 
Sunnyvale use the unique election system. (CSV, 2006) To confirm this information, an 
email was sent to the City Clerks distribution list operated by the League of California 
Cities requesting the identification of other ALBS municipalities.  Of the 697 City Clerk 
professionals on the distribution list, only the Cities of Santa Clara, Sunnyvale and Chula 
Vista were identified as using the ALBS system. (Okabe, 2012; Norris, 2012) However, 
the City of Chula Vista requires a majority for victory, with an initial primary election in 
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the spring and a runoff if necessary.  This was not comparable to the ALBS system found 
in Santa Clara and Sunnyvale, which use a plurality process and a November election 
cycle.   
 Due to this limited use of the ALBS system, the sample size of any statistical 
analysis will be relatively small.  However, the City of Santa Clara and City of Sunnyvale 
are often regarded as exceptional models of government and are a compelling basis for 
research.  The City of Santa Clara has received the Helen Putnam Grand Prize award for 
its Vote Ethics good government and community engagement programs. (CSC, 2012c) 
The City of Sunnyvale was recognized for its performance-based budget practices in 
Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government in 1993. (pp. 138 – 165)  Both 
municipalities are financially stable with a high standard of living and are generally 
recognized as well-run cities.  They have also effectively used the ALBS system for 
approximately 80 years, combined.  The entrepreneurial nature of their city governments, 
as well as the presence of comparable elections and census statistics allow them to be an 
appealing foundation on which to base research comparing the ALBS and BAL systems.   
 As benchmarks for the even year presidential and gubernatorial election cycles, 
the City of Santa Clara as an ALBS example was compared to the Cities of Milpitas and 
Mountain View, which use BAL systems.  As benchmarks for the odd-year uniform 
district election “UDEL” cycles, the City of Sunnyvale was compared to the Cities of 
Cupertino and Palo Alto.  To be clear, the inclusion of the word “district” in the UDEL 
title refers to the overall agency, such as a city or school district, rather than a subset or 
district within that jurisdiction.  Data from a ten-year period, including the election cycles 
of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 for the even-year cycle, and 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 
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and 2009 for the odd-year cycle was compiled into a database.  It should be noted that the 
City of Palo Alto recently changed to a presidential cycle, with 2009 being their final 
odd-year election for comparison. 
 Numerous variables contribute to voter turnout.  For example, individuals with 
greater resources, such as wealth and knowledge, tend to vote at a higher rate than those 
without. (Tenn, 2005, p. 280, 281; Matsusaka, 1995, p. 112) It should follow that the 
more affluent, educated and engaged communities will have higher rates of participation.  
An assessment of these factors in the benchmark cities will provide a basis for 
understanding if the ALBS or BAL systems influence elections, or if the outcomes are 
driven by demographics.  While a more complex regression analysis would be necessary 
to determine the true statistical influence of these characteristics, they can be used 
anecdotally at face value.  Trends should in general be consistent with those seen in 
census and voter registration data, with higher income, education and voter registration 
levels yielding greater voter and candidate engagement. 
To the extent possible, care was taken to ensure that the benchmark cities and 
available data were comparable.  Geographically, they share contiguous borders in the 
South Bay and Peninsula regions of Santa Clara County.  They also contract with the 
Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters (SCCROV) as a regional elections office, 
assuring that data and reports would be derived and presented in a consistent format.  
Demographic information was available from the 2010 census completed by the US 
Census Bureau and voter registration data was provided by the SCCROV for the 2010 
time fame as well. (US Census Bureau, 2012a – f; SCCROV, 2010) It should be noted 
that the statistics regarding the portion of the population which was registered to vote 
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used those 18 and over as a base, but did not eliminate those precluded from voting due 
to citizenship or other requirements.  Additionally, the data regarding those with a college 
degree was a universe of those 25 or older (Percival, 2013) and wealth was measured per-
household.   
The even-year cycle cities 
are fairly similar regarding 
household income, showing a 
variance of $7,400, or an 8.7% 
increase between the lowest and 
highest earners.  However, college 
graduation rates differ by a larger 
rate of 19.3%.  Odd-year cycle cities 
again have a larger disparity in both 
areas, with a more than $30,000 income variance, or a 33.8% increase between the lowest 
and highest earners and a 
college graduate rate delta of 
23.2%.   
With only a 4.7% 
variance, the even-year 
election cycle cities are fairly 
clustered regarding the portion 
of the population which were 
registered to vote.  However, 
          Table 2: 2010 Census and Voter Registration  
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Santa Clara Even ALBS 
      
93,073  
      
46,908  50.4% 
Milpitas Even BAL 
      
51,495  
      
25,773  50.0% 
Mountain View Even BAL 
      
59,475  
      
32,549  54.7% 
                     
Sunnyvale Odd ALBS 
     
108,703  
      
54,705  50.3% 
Cupertino Odd BAL 
      
42,211  
      
26,826  63.7% 
Palo Alto Odd BAL 
      
49,333  
      
36,917  74.8% 
        Table 1: 2010 Median Income and Education 
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Santa Clara Even ALBS  $85,294  48.8% 
Milpitas Even BAL  $92,694  39.4% 
Mountain View Even BAL  $88,244  58.7% 
          
Sunnyvale Odd ALBS  $90,174  56.1% 
Cupertino Odd BAL  $120,201  74.4% 
Palo Alto Odd BAL  $120,670  79.3% 
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the disparity is much larger with the odd-year cycle cities, ranging from 50.3% to 74.8%, 
for a 24.5% variance.   
 Voter Engagement: It is believed that the BAL system allows voters greater 
flexibility to choose their preferred candidates regardless of seat designation, as well as 
the ability to bullet-vote.  However, the ALBS system has a more direct ballot layout and 
an ability to cast votes for each opening without diluting support among competing 
candidates.  It has been acknowledged that the highest voter turnout in the United States 
is seen in national elections during a presidential election cycle.  State, local and other 
races farther down the ballot have “considerably lower turnout.” (Lijphart, 1997, p. 5) An 
assessment of even-year presidential and gubernatorial election cycles comparing voter 
fall-off  between overall turnout and that specific to city council races in benchmark cities 
will help determine which system fosters more voter engagement at a municipal level. 
 As a basis for considering municipal voter engagement in the ALBS and BAL 
systems, voter fall-off was determined for local contests.  A ten year, five election cycle 
period from 2002 – 2010 was used as the data set.  The total votes cast in city council 
races were divided by the number of seats being considered to determine the average 
municipal voter turnout.  The total votes cast in the city was then divided by the number 
of registered voters to determine the overall turnout, including contests at the top of the 
ticket.  The municipal turnout was then subtracted from overall turnout to determine voter 
fall-off for local contests.   
The City of Santa Clara was the ALBS example and the Cities of Milpitas and 
Mountain View were the BAL examples.  It should be noted that since odd-year election 
cycles focus primarily on municipal and school district contests, they normally do not 
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include an up-ballot race on which to judge fall-off.  As such, the benchmark cities for 
the assessment of voter engagement will be limited to those in the even-year presidential 
and gubernatorial cycle cities. 
 
                                                        Table 3: Voter Fall-Off  
Election Cycle 
City of Santa Clara 
(ALBS) 
City of Milpitas 
(BAL) 
City of Mountain View 
(BAL) 
2002 Voter Fall-Off 9.86% 11.19% 15.09% 
2004 Voter Fall-Off 15.55% 15.82% 25.04% 
2006 Voter Fall-Off 9.66% 9.28% 16.40% 
2008 Voter Fall-Off 21.62% 27.44% 37.23% 
2010 Voter Fall-Off 14.54% 15.63% 26.64% 
Avg, Voter Fall-Off 14.25% 15.87% 24.08% 
 
 
Table 4: Overall Average 
Voter Fall-Off     
BAL Avg. Fall-Off: 19.98%   
ALBS Avg. Fall-Off: 14.25%  
Total 5.73% 
Less Voter Fall-Off in 
ALBS System 
 
 
 The data show a voter fall-off rate of 14.25% for Santa Clara, the ALBS city.  The 
fall-off rates for the BAL cities were 15.87% and 24.08%, for Milpitas and Mountain 
View, respectively.  In total, there was greater voter engagement in the ALBS system, 
with an average of 5.73% less fall-off.   
 Hypothesis testing of the question, “Is there a significant difference in voter drop-
off rates between ALBS and BAL elections?” was also completed using a two-proportion 
Z test and a significance level of 1%.  The analysis yielded results where Z was equal to 
20.741 and the p-value was 8.09 x 10-96.  This allowed the rejection of the null hypothesis 
and the conclusion that the difference in voter turnout is in fact statistically significant 
and cannot be explained by random chance. (Rahim, 2013b) 
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 Comparing this to US Census and voter registration data can provide an anecdotal 
sense of whether these results mirror income, education and voter registration trends.  
The City of Santa Clara had the least voter fall-off at 14.25% while the City of Mountain 
View had the highest at 24.08% (see Diagram 3).  Income, education and voter 
registration levels were not consistent with these trends.  While Santa Clara had a 9.9% 
higher level of voter engagement, Mountain View was 3.5% more wealthy than Santa 
Clara with an average household income of $88,244 compared to $85,294, respectively 
(see Diagram 4).  Santa Clara also had a lower level of college graduates at 48.8% 
compared to Mountain View at 58.7% (see Diagram 5).  And, the City of Mountain View 
had a higher level of voter registration at 54.7% compared to 50.4% in Santa Clara (see 
Diagram 6).  While it would be expected that the more affluent, educated and registered 
population would have greater participation and less voter fall-off, this was not the case 
when comparing the benchmark cities. 
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  Diagram 5                                                        Diagram 6    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If in fact participation is influenced by the type of elections process, projected 
outcomes from changing from one system to the other can be estimated using past 
elections data.  In this, the total municipal turnout for each election cycle is multiplied by 
the 5.73% difference in voter participation from Table 4.  This yields the projected 
increase, or reduction, in voter participation for each election, which is then totaled to 
derive how many more or fewer votes would be received during a ten year period if the 
city changed from one system to the other.  The overall total is then divided by the 
number of election cycles to estimate the average increase, or decrease in voter 
participation per election.  The exercise indicated that the City of Santa Clara could 
expect an average 2631 vote drop per election in municipal turnout if it changed from an 
ALBS to a BAL system.  Similarly, if Milpitas and Mountain View changed from a BAL 
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to an ALBS system, they could expect an average increase of 1432 votes and 1978 votes 
per cycle, respectively. 
 
Table 5: Potential Change in Fall-Off if 
Santa Clara Used BAL System   
City of Santa Clara # of potential votes 
2002 Less Voter Turnout 2406 
2004 Less Voter Turnout 2898 
2006 Less Voter Turnout 2499 
2008 Less Voter Turnout 2668 
2010 Less Voter Turnout 2687 
Fewer Voters Over 10 Years 13157 
Average Per Election Cycle 2631 
 
 
Table 6: Potential Change in 
Fall-Off if Milpitas Used ALBS 
System    
Table 7: Potential Change in Fall-
Off if Mountain View Used ALBS 
System   
City of Milpitas 
# of 
potential 
votes  City of Mountain View 
# of 
potential 
votes 
2002 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1262  2002 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1943 
2004 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1565  2004 Adtl. Voter Turnout 2308 
2006 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1377  2006 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1829 
2008 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1479  2008 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1944 
2010 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1476  2010 Adtl. Voter Turnout 1864 
Additional Voters Over 10 
Years 7159 
 
Additional Voters Over 10 Years 9888 
Average Per Election Cycle 1432 
 
Average Per Election Cycle 1978 
 
 
 Candidate Engagement: Candidate engagement in an elections system can 
influence the number of contenders from which voters have the opportunity to choose 
their representatives.  It is believed that the simplicity of the BAL system during the 
filing and nomination process may be more approachable for candidates.  With all 
openings considered collectively, there is only one potential filing option from which to 
choose.  However, the flexibility of numerous contests to seek election found in the 
ALBS process and the ability to run while choosing not to face an ally or incumbent may 
also be appealing.   
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 An assessment of the number of candidates who file to run, per open seat, should 
help to identify if either the ALBS or BAL process has an effect on candidate 
engagement.  In this case, all six benchmark cities were used, with the even-year cycle 
cities from 2002 – 2010 and the odd-year cycle cities from 2001 – 2009.  To do so, the 
number of contenders who sought election during that timeframe were summed to derive 
the total candidates for each municipality.  At the same time, the number of seats that 
were considered during that timeframe were also summed to derive the total seats for 
each city.  The total number of candidates for each election was divided by the number of 
seats being considered to determine the average candidates per seat.  The average 
number of candidates per seat for the ALBS system was then compared to that for the 
BAL system benchmarks to determine which fosters more candidates.   
                                               Table 8: Even-Year Cycle, 2002 - 2010 
City of Santa Clara (ALBS)    
City of Milpitas 
(BAL)    
City of Mountain View 
(BAL)   
Total Seats 14  Total Seats 10  Total Seats 18 
Total Candidates 37  Total Candidates 29  Total Candidates 41 
Average Candidates Per Seat 2.64     2.90     2.28 
 
 
                                                  Table 9: Odd-Year Cycle, 2001 - 2009 
City of Sunnyvale (ALBS)    
City of Cupertino 
(BAL)    
City of Palo Alto 
(BAL)   
Total Seats 17  Total Seats 13  Total Seats 23 
Total Candidates 36  Total Candidates 29  Total Candidates 63 
Average Candidates Per 
Seat 2.12     2.23     2.74 
 
 
                                        Table 10: Candidate Engagement                                                       
Overall Average 
  
  
BAL Candidates Per Seat 2.54   
ALBS Candidates Per Seat 2.38   
Total 0.16 6.58% 
More candidates per opening in 
a BAL system 
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 The data indicate that an average of 6.58% more candidates per opening file to 
run for city council in BAL elections than in ALBS contests.  This is the equivalent of an 
additional .16 of a candidate filing to run for each seat the BAL system.  Of course, a 
partial candidate cannot file to run for city council and the actual number of additional 
candidates in a given city or election would vary depending on the number of seats on the 
ballot. 
 Hypothesis testing of the question, “Is there a significant difference in candidates 
per seat between BAL and ALBS elections?” was also completed using a two-proportion 
Z test and a significance level of 1%.  The analysis yielded results where Z was equal to 
0.393 and the p-value was 0.346.  This precluded the rejection of the null hypothesis and 
concluded that the difference in the number of candidates was not statistically significant 
and could be explained by random chance. (Rahim, 2013a) While a statistical relation 
was not precluded it was also not proven, and the results of the research should be 
considered anecdotal. 
 Regardless of the status of the data as statistically significant or not, additional 
information can be gleaned by comparing the outcomes in the benchmark cities with 
demographic trends.  It would be expected that the municipalities with higher income, 
education and voter registration levels would also have a greater candidate engagement.  
For the benchmarks elections during the even-year cycle, the correlation between income, 
education and voter registration was inconsistent.  The City of Milpitas had the highest 
number of candidates at 2.9 per seat while the City of Mountain View had the fewest 
candidates at 2.28 per seat (see Diagram 7).  Milpitas was 5% more wealthy than 
Mountain View, with an average household income of $92,694 compared to $88,244, 
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respectively, which is consistent with demographic trends (see Diagram 8).  However, 
education levels did not follow this pattern, with the lowest level of college graduation 
found in Milpitas at 39.4% compared to the highest level in Mountain View at 58.7% 
(see Diagram 9).  Additionally, Milpitas had the lowest level of voter registration at 
50.0% while the City of Mountain View had the highest level of voter registration at 
54.7% (see Diagram 10).  
 For the benchmark elections during the odd-year cycle, the correlation between 
income, education and voter registration was more consistent.  The City of Palo Alto had 
the highest number of candidates at 2.74 per seat while the City of Sunnyvale had the 
fewest candidates at 2.12 per seat (see Diagram 7).  Income, education and voter 
registration levels followed this trend.  Perhaps most significant, Palo Alto was 34% 
more affluent than Sunnyvale, with average household incomes of $120,670 and $90,174, 
respectively (see Diagram 8).  The highest level of college graduation was also found in 
Palo Alto at 79.3% compared to the lowest level in Sunnyvale at 56.1% (see Diagram 9).  
This trend continued regarding voter registration, which was 74.8% in Palo Alto with 
50.3% found in Sunnyvale (see Diagram 10).   
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 If the number of candidates who seek election is in fact influenced by the type of 
elections process, estimated results from changing the system can be projected in relation 
to the number of seats that were up for consideration during the timeframe.  In this, the 
total seats for each election cycle is multiplied by the .16 additional candidates per seat 
ratio from Table 10.  This yields the projected increase or decrease in the number of 
candidates in both a raw and percentage form for each election.  Those numbers are then 
totaled to derive how many fewer or more candidates would have run during a ten year 
period if the city changed from one system to the other.  The overall total is then divided 
by the number of election cycles to estimate the average increase, or decrease in 
candidate engagement per cycle.  It is important to note that applying the .16 additional 
candidate ratio per seat rather than the 6.58% average from Table 10 enables the creation 
of data both in the change in candidate and as a percentage for each individual 
municipality. 
     
Even-Year Election Cycle 
 
                             Potential Change if Santa Clara Used BAL System   
City of Santa Clara (ALBS) Candidates 
# of 
Seats Ratio 
Adtl. 
Cand. 
% 
Change 
2002 Election Cycle 6.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 5.33% 
2004 Election Cycle 12.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 5.33% 
2006 Election Cycle 5.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 6.40% 
2008 Election Cycle 10.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 6.40% 
2010 Election Cycle 4.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 8.00% 
Additional Cand. Over 10 yrs. 
  
  2.24 6.05% 
Additional Cand. Per Cycle 
      0.45   
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                             Potential Change if Milpitas Used ALBS System   
City of Milpitas (BAL) Candidates # of Seats Ratio Adtl. Cand. 
% 
Change 
2002 Election Cycle 6.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 5.33% 
2004 Election Cycle 5.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 6.40% 
2006 Election Cycle 6.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 5.33% 
2008 Election Cycle 4.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 8.00% 
2010 Election Cycle 8.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 4.00% 
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs. 
    
  1.60 5.52% 
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle 
      0.32   
 
                             Potential Change if Mountain View Used ALBS System   
City of Mountain View (BAL) Candidates 
# of 
Seats Ratio Adtl. Cand. 
% 
Change 
2002 Election Cycle 13.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 4.92% 
2004 Election Cycle 6.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 10.67% 
2006 Election Cycle 8.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 6.00% 
2008 Election Cycle 8.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 8.00% 
2010 Election Cycle 6.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 8.00% 
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs. 
    
  2.88 7.02% 
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle 
      0.58   
 
 
Odd-Year Election Cycle 
 
                             Potential Change if Sunnyvale Used BAL System   
City of Sunnyvale (ALBS) Candidates 
# of 
Seats Ratio 
Adtl. 
Cand. 
% 
Change 
2001 Election Cycle 7.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 6.86% 
2003 Election Cycle 9.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 7.11% 
2005 Election Cycle 7.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 6.86% 
2007 Election Cycle 7.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 9.14% 
2009 Election Cycle 6.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 8.00% 
Additional Cand. Over 10 yrs. 
    
  2.72 7.56% 
Additional Cand. Per Cycle 
      0.54   
 
                             Potential Change if Cupertino Used ALBS System   
City of Cupertion (BAL) Candidates # of Seats Ratio Adtl. Cand. 
% 
Change 
2001 Election Cycle 6.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 8.00% 
2003 Election Cycle 4.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 8.00% 
2005 Election Cycle 6.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 8.00% 
2007 Election Cycle 6.00 2.00 0.16 0.32 5.33% 
2009 Election Cycle 7.00 3.00 0.16 0.48 6.86% 
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs. 
    
  2.08 7.17% 
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle 
      0.42   
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                             Potential Change if Palo Alto Used ALBS System   
City of Palo Alto (BAL) Candidates # of Seats Ratio Adtl. Cand. 
% 
Change 
2001 Election Cycle 14.00 5.00 0.16 0.80 5.71% 
2003 Election Cycle 11.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 5.82% 
2005 Election Cycle 12.00 5.00 0.16 0.80 6.67% 
2007 Election Cycle 12.00 4.00 0.16 0.64 5.33% 
2009 Election Cycle 14.00 5.00 0.16 0.80 5.71% 
Fewer Cand. Over 10 yrs. 
    
  3.68 5.84% 
Fewer Cand. Per Cycle 
      0.74   
 
 
 The data indicate that as a tangible effect, the BAL system would yield one 
additional candidate for voters to consider every two to four election cycles, or a 5.52% – 
7.56% larger pool of candidates.  This offered an additional 1.6 – 3.68 candidates per 
benchmark city over a ten year period, or .32 – .74 candidates per election cycle. 
 
Analysis 
 Research has indicated a statistically significant difference in voter turnout with 
5.73% higher participation of the overall electorate in the ALBS system.  Additionally, a 
nominal difference of 6.58% in the number of candidates in the BAL system was seen, 
though this was not statistically significant and could be explained on the basis of random 
chance.  As such, more weight should be given to the findings of increased voter 
participation in the ALBS system than the increased candidate participation in the BAL 
process. 
 Overall, there was an inconsistent correlation between the level of income, 
education or voter registration regarding either voter participation or candidate 
engagement.  With these key demographic trends showing a disconnect or irregular 
relation to the voter and candidate data in the benchmark cities, it is likely that outside 
factors such as the elections process influenced the results. 
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 The implementation of the ALBS and BAL benchmark elections was the 
responsibility of the Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters.  Former Assistant Registrar 
of Voters Elaine Larson retired in 2012 with 22 years of experience as an elections 
professional.  In an interview, Ms. Larson indicated that, based on the disconnect 
between voter and candidate participation rates, and the income, education and voter 
registration levels of the benchmarks, it is likely that the election system had an 
influence.  A long ballot as sometimes found in the BAL system can intimidate or fatigue 
people to the point that some do not use all of their entitled votes or skip contests 
completely.  Additionally, sometimes people don’t read how many votes they can cast in 
the BAL system, and don’t realize they can vote for more than one candidate.  Further, 
Ms. Larson indicated that the ALBS ballot layout is more clear and less complex than the 
BAL system.  If people are prompted to vote in each contest as seen in the ALBS 
process, they are more likely to do so.  The lack of bullet-voting in the ALBS system 
likely caused larger turnout as well.  While there was a less significant effect on 
candidate engagement, it was felt that in general the ALBS system was more strategic 
and the BAL process more simple.  For candidates with political savvy, the by-seat 
process allowed more flexibility to run without going against an ally or an incumbent, 
unless so desired.  However, the lack of seat designations in the BAL system eliminates 
one of the choices necessary to run for council so may be more approachable for those 
who are not as experienced.  Overall, Ms. Larson shared that the significant increase in 
voter turnout seemed more valuable to the elections process than the small increase in the 
number of potential candidates.  A larger portion of the electorate was involved in the 
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democratic process of choosing their representatives, and through this had a say in the 
future of their city. (Larson, 2013) 
 However, the assessment of benchmark trends should not be limited to their 
relation to US Census and voter registration data.  There are a number of academic and 
anecdotal dynamics that should also be considered regarding the implications and 
consequences of the ALBS and BAL elections processes. 
 While traditional political literature has determined causality between negative 
campaigning and lower voter turnout, more recent studies have indicated that American 
voters are more resilient.  One possibility is that the nature of civility or incivility in the 
debate may have more impact than the overall presence of negative campaigning. 
(Brooks, 2006, pp. 693, 694) To the extent that the more direct debate in the ALBS 
system is focused on issues rather than personal attacks, the information and attention 
garnered from the discussion may yield higher turnout. 
 Major factors in determining community participation are access to information 
and the expected “legislative profits” from an election.  In this, higher engagement is 
expected in relation to the perceived importance of the election, or the legislative profits 
of the contest. (Settle & Abrams, 1976, pp. 81, 82, 87, 88) For example, increased turnout 
has been found in states which tax or spend at a higher rate, providing voters with a 
greater economic stake in the outcome of the election. (Percival, Currin-Percival, Bowler 
& van der Kolk, 2007, pp. 137, 138) Participation is also influenced by the personal 
exposure to and the desire to assimilate political information. (Tolbert, McNeal & Smith, 
2003, p. 27) However, demonstrating the vital role that municipalities play in government 
and the accompanying legislative profits can be difficult.  The lack of attention paid to 
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local affairs by media outlets may hinder the public’s ability to garner much of this 
information. (Lieski, 1989, p. 153, 154) Gerston indicates, “It is in that no man’s land of 
politics that local elected officials in California operate … their accomplishments … are 
often buried deep in local newspapers or mentioned almost as afterthoughts on television 
news, if at all.” (2012, p. 139) To the extent the ALBS or BAL system offers a more open 
or transparent process of governance, they may allow the public and media to more 
readily determine the legislative profits therein.  Should the profits be compelling, this 
may in turn drive greater participation in local government. 
 The more direct competition seen in the ALBS system may also provide greater 
clarity for voter decisions and therefore cause higher turnout.  Matsusaka noted that 
people are more likely to vote if they have a clear understanding of who is the best 
candidate. (1995, p. 112) Levine and Palfrey have also indicated a sharp decline in 
turnout as the “cost,” or effort required to assess candidates and vote increases. (2007, p. 
155) The ease by which people determine the best candidate decreases the cost of 
participating in the process and increases turnout.  It may be that both the more critical 
nature of the ALBS system as well as the individual by-seat contests allow voters to more 
readily discern which candidates best reflect their own ideologies.  With candidates 
separated into smaller groups for individual seat contests, the ALBS system offers a more 
manageable number of contenders to compare rather than the collective field in the BAL 
process.  And, the debate in the ALBS system for each seat being directed between fewer 
candidates may provide more focused information for the voter to use in determining 
which is their desired representative. 
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 In Nonvoting and the Decisiveness of Electoral Outcomes, Abramson, Diskin and 
Felsenthal discussed variations on the Downsian “voting paradox” in which residents 
who feel their individual vote will not affect the outcome of an election are less likely to 
participate.  This in turn empowers those who choose to vote and favors their desired 
outcomes. (pp. 500, 501, 510) It appears that the higher rate of voter turnout and 
engagement in the ALBS system either fosters or has been fostered by the empowerment 
of a broader portion of the community.  An alternative point of view could be that 
residents who choose to bullet-vote in the BAL system are allowed greater influence for 
their specific favored candidate, which is also a form of empowerment.  However, it 
should be noted that there is a risk in the BAL system of multiple candidates from 
minority or underrepresented segments of the community splitting votes from a discrete 
support base.  In this case, bullet-voting in the BAL system may be detrimental to the 
success of multiple minority candidates while the separate seats in the ALBS system may 
provide a structure allowing fuller engagement of these communities.    
 While the structure of contests in the ALBS system was created to foster greater 
incumbent accountability, the nature of higher turnout may in itself have an effect.   
Wright has indicated that “… the non-partisan ballot drives down participation and yields 
an even greater electoral advantage for incumbents.” (Wright, 2008, p. 14) While local 
races in California are obligated by law to be non-partisan, the higher voter turnout and 
engagement in the ALBS system may foster its own form of incumbent accountability. 
 Additionally, the two systems differ regarding the ability for a sitting council 
member to run unopposed.  It is unlikely that incumbents will garner no challengers in 
the BAL system.  With multiple seats on the ballot collectively, it is probable that at least 
  38 
one challenger will file, which means all of the candidates will be opposed.  One point of 
view is that this is desirable, and that all incumbents should be required to run against 
competitors for re-election to share their political ideologies and be judged by the public.  
Another point of view is that the potential for a high-performing council member to run 
unopposed may lead them to be more responsive to community needs in pursuit of that 
goal.  In the ALBS system it is more likely that a well-prepared incumbent in an 
individual seat will run unopposed.  Challengers may choose instead to file in either an 
open seat or one with a weak incumbent.  The decrease in fundraising necessary for 
unopposed incumbents may lessen the influence of money in that particular seat as well 
as provide more time for the council member to focus on the process of governance. 
 
Conclusion 
 The question remains, what does this information mean for residents, elections 
officials and local governments?  Proponents of the ALBS system will contend the 5.73% 
overall increase in the voter turnout yielding 7,159 – 13,157 participants for benchmark 
cities during a ten year timeframe is significant.  However, those who favor the BAL 
system may contend that the 5.52% – 7.56% increase in the candidate pool yielding 1.6 – 
3.68 more candidates over a ten year period is also of benefit.  As much of this 
assessment is relative to the needs of the individual community and the environment in 
which the elections systems operate, either may be a viable alternative depending on the 
circumstances. 
 However, the gains seen in voter and community engagement in the ALBS 
system are difficult to overlook.  Putnam has indicated that, “It is sometimes hard to tell 
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whether voting causes community engagement or vice-versa, although some recent 
evidence suggest that the act of voting itself encourages volunteering and other forms of 
good citizenship.  So it is hardly a small matter for American democracy when voting 
rates decline … .” (2000, p. 35) Given this, it is likely that the considerable increase in 
voter engagement in the ALBS system will produce greater public benefit than the 
nominally larger number of candidates in the BAL system.  This is augmented by the 
statistical significance of the voter engagement data, while the results of the candidate 
engagement data could be explained by random chance. 
 As a foundation for democracy, the structure of a local election system should 
not be taken lightly or influenced by the potential for political gain.  In considering which 
system would be of most benefit to a municipality, it is important to focus on the actual 
needs of the community.  Those unsuccessful in an established system may seek change 
in an effort to increase their political chances.  At the same time, incumbents may be 
hesitant to change due to their familiarity and success in the current process as well as 
uncertainty regarding alternate systems. (Bowler, Donovan and Karp, 2006, p. 435) 
Neither is the correct impetus for adhering to or changing an election system.  The 
process which best fits the culture and needs of each unique community should be that 
which is favored, regardless of challenger or incumbent status.   
 Policy makers and voters should also be cautious that change for the sake of 
change, or to suit political motivations, may yield unforeseen or unintended outcomes.  
The results may be different but not necessarily better.  An example is seen in Losing 
Fewer Votes, where it was shown that changing to new elections technology is usually 
accompanied by a decline in voter turnout, due primarily to unfamiliarity with the process 
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and a failure to cast votes properly. (Hanmer, Park, Traugott, Niemi, Hernson, Bederson 
& Conrad, 2010, pp. 129, 139) It is likely that a change from the BAL to the ALBS 
system, or vice versa, would cause similar voter confusion and an initial drop in turnout.  
The extent to which this decrease is sustained would depend on how engrained past 
practice is in the community, how intuitive the new ballot type is found to be and how 
aggressively voter education is pursued to explain the new system. 
 Certainly, this research is not exhaustive and is meant as a starting point for the 
academic discussion of the ALBS system.  Future study of incumbency success rates, 
ballot statement costs, funding levels of political campaigns, or measurements of political 
and governmental performance would be pertinent as well.  Efforts as simple as 
extending the existing 10-year data set to a longer time frame would further test the 
current findings.  A further step of using a more robust regression analysis to statistically 
determine the influence of demographic and census data on the outcomes would also lend 
additional credibility.  And, looking outside of California to states such as Washington, 
which uses variations of the ALBS process as its main elections system may yield 
additional benchmarks for study. (Katsuyama, 2013; Meinig, 2013) With the limited 
body of academic knowledge regarding the ALBS system, there are numerous additional 
foci of study that could yield valuable information. 
However, it is hoped this will lend itself toward a tangible body of knowledge.  It 
has recently been lamented that on a state level in California, “Reform is an idle concept 
left to the whimsical who fail to understand the intractable political cement otherwise 
known as the status quo.” (Gerston, 2012, p. 199) On a local level, policy makers have 
fewer institutional constraints and a greater opportunity to enact change.  Should the need 
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present itself in a local municipality, the ALBS system has shown itself to be at least one 
more viable option for elections reform.   
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